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RETALIATION AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS.

The Leonora.
HE readjustment of international law to the ever-changing conditions of maritime warfare has always presented problems
of extreme difficulty. Particularly is this the case, when, as
in the Napoleonic wars and the recent European conflict, belligerents, falling back upon the exceptional plea of necessity, attempt to
modify the rights of neutral powers to their own advantage or even
to involve them in the conflict. A question of this character, namely, the extent to which a belligerent in pursuing retaliatory measures
agains(alleged violations of international law by his opponent, may
thereby abridge the admitted rights of neutrals, was raised in a recent English prize case, The Leonora,1 and, as the issues were ably
argued both for the Crown and the claimants, the judgment rendered
merits critical examination. The fact that the decision is rather a
diffuse historical disquisition on the rights of belligerents to restrain
neutral trade than such a concise statement of principle as we are
wont to associate with an English judgment, will perhaps not obscure the simple and fundamental nature of the questions at stake.
The facts, which were undisputed, admit of little difficulty. The
Leonora, a small Dutch steamer, chartered by the "G. & L. Beijers
Import and Export A/B" of Stockholm, was captured by British
cruisers whilst on a voyage from Rotterdam to Stockholm, both
neutral ports. She was laden with a cargo of coal produced in
Belgian collieries under German control and sold by a German
Government department to Beijers as agent for the Stockholm Gas
and Electricity Company. 2 The Crown claimed the capture and
condemnation of both vessel and cargo under the retaliatory Order
in Council of February 16, 1917, by which it was provided that
vessels carrying goods with an enemy destination or of enemy
origin were liable to condemnation, unless they called at a British
or allied port for an examination of their cargoes, and that goods
· found on examination of any vessel to be of enemy origin or enemy

T

1 [1918] P. 182. In order to preclude misunderstanding, it should be noted that
The Leonora is under criticism in this article as the decision of a British prize court
and, therefore, English authorities are largely relied upon. The broader political and
diplomatic aspects of the policy which relied upon the Order in Council as a measure
of defence form, of course, another question to be decided upon its own merits.
2 The point was raised by the charterers ·that the coal was not of enemy origin,
but the Court decided, and rightly it seems, that the fact that it was produced under
·German Government control made it such. [1918] P. 182, 230.
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destination were also to be condemned.3 On the other hand, the
claimants, both shipowners and charterers, contended that neither
goods nor vessel were liable to condemnation, since the Order was
illegal and invalid as against neutrals.
The main issue ·before the Court may be shortly summarized as
follows :-Can a belligerent, as an incident to and in order to enforce
measures of retaliation against his enemy, lay hitherto unrecognized
restrictions upon neutral trade, involving not merely inconvenience
but even serious loss to neutral shipping? This the Court resolved
in the affirmative.
The importance of this decision, if it were to be accepted as a
modification of the law of neutral rights, is obvious. For prima
facie it admits practices which offend against international law in at
least the following respects:
I. A "quasi-blockade" is established, not satisfying the requirements of legitimate blockade; in particular since it applies specifically
to neutral ports. 4 Nor can it probably be regarded as effectif
in the sense established by the Declaration of Paris, 1856.5 Of this
the Court is not unaware; in fact, it is admitted that the method of
•blockade instituted by the Order in Council would probably not be
accepted as in accordance with prevailing law. To quote the words
of the learned President:"It is of course true that according to the existing rules of
international law there can be no blockade of neutral ports
or coast lines. The Order in Council does not purport to
declare a blockade of the ports to which it applies in the
strict sense in which that term is used in international law.
But the dbject at which it aimed as regards the enemy is
similar. In saying this, I am not suggesting that the method
adopted by the Order in Council has been accepted by the
3 The Order in Council is given in full in the report at page 183.
The sections
relevant to the present discussion are as follows:
"2. Any vessel carrying goods with an enemy destination, or of enemy
origin, shall be liable to capture and condemnation in respect of the carriage
of such goods; provided that, in the case of any vessel which calls at an appointed British or allied port for the examination of her cargo, no sentence of
condemnation shall he pronounced in respect only of the carriage of goods of
enemy origin or destination, and no such presumption as is laiH down in Art. I
shall arise. 3. Goods which are found on the examination of any vessel to
be goods of enemy origin or of enemy destination shall be liable to condemna·
tion." [1918] P. 182, 184.
•See The Frau llsabe, 4 Rob. 63, 64; The Pelerhofj, s Wallace 28, 52; The Declaration of London, 1909, Arts. 1 and I 8.
4 As the counsel for the claimants point out, "the Order is unlimited in its area and
would apply to vessels seized, e.g. in the Pacific Ocean, if sailing from a port which
affords access to an enemy country." [1918], P. 182, 188.
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nations in such a way that it already forms part of established law. * * *It is not a blockade of enemy ports. But it is a
stoppage or quasi-blockade of the enemy's maritime trade
th~ough adjacent ports." 6
2. A neutral ship plying between neutral ports is condemned as
a carrier of goods of enemy origin. This is clearly contrary to the
general principle that neutral traders may carry or deal in enemy
goods, subject of course to the well-known restrictions in the case of
contraband, ·blockade, or unneutral servic!!, and that irrespective of
whether the trade is through enemy or neutral ports.7
3. Enemy goods covered by a neutral flag are condemned, although .not contraband of war. This is in direct contravention of
article 2 of the Declaration of Paris, I856, one of the few conventions generally recognized as declaratory of international law, and
to which Great Britain is signatory.8
4. Neutral ships, in order to avoid condemnation for the carriage of enemy goods, are required to submit their cargoes for examination at British or allied ports. This is a wide extension of the
ordinarily accepted rule that, although neutral vessels may 'be
brought in to a belligerent port for adjudication, provided there is
reasonable ground for suspicion, the right of visit and search is
exercisable by a belligerent only on the high seas or in non-neutral
waters. 9
There are other points in the Order to which exception might be
taken, as for instance the presumption that it sets up against a
neutral ship sailing to or from a·neutral port having access to enemy
territory,10 but as they are not involved in the decision, they need
not be treated in this connection.
Th'e legal grounds for the decision may now be examined.
A. It is held that the provisions of the Order in Council of
6

E1918], P. 182, 205.

See Gist v. Mason, l T. R. 8.;, 85; Barker v. Blakes, 9 East 282, 292; Bell v. Reid,
l M. and S., 726, 733; Chitty, Law of Nations, 165, 187; Manning, Commentaries, 193;
Phillimore, International Law, III, 204 ff.; Oppenheim, International Law, II, 385; and
also the authorities referred to in note 49.
The present case cannot possibly be construed as an application ot the doctrine
of "continuous transport'' to contraband articles, as there is no hostile destination.
• 46 British and Foreign State Papers, 27.
a See The Maria, l Rob 340, 360; The Peacock, 4 Rob 185, 189; The Elsebe, 5 Rob
173, lS4; Cremidi v. Powell, The Gerasimo, I I Moore P. C. C. 88, n6 In The Zamora,
[1916], 2 A. C. 77, 108, the Court takes the view, not unreasonable as a suggested
change in the law, that the bringing of a vessel into a harbour for search is "a practice
which is justifiable because sea;ch at sea is impossible under the conditions of modern
warfare," but there appears to be no authority for the dictum.
10 Art. l, [1918], P. 182, 183.
T
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February 16, 1917, though perhaps not forming a part as yet of established law, at least do not offend against the guiding principles of
the law of the nations.
In the fi~st place, the learned President, disregarding the inconvenient technicalities which are ordinarily accepted in the case of
contraband and blockade as defining the rights of a belligerent, thus
summarizes the principle upon which these rights are based:
"Broadly, the principle is that the maritime commerce of
neutrals is subject to restriction by the acts of States at
war, if that commerce tends to assist an enemy either directly
in his warlike operations, or indirectly in the carrying on of
his own trade upon whi~h his power of continuing the war
may largely, or even entirely, depend." 11
Then, after pointing out that international law is a living organism,
adaptable to changing conditions, and in especial that its boundaries
have in the course of the nineteenth century been widely extended
by the application of this principle of maritime warfare, the Court
proceeds to the conclusion that the Order in Council, since it involves restraint of neutral trade for the same purposes as in the
case of blockade, may be regarded as a justifiable application of the
general principle, even though not yet accepted as international law.
- As to this,-aside from the presumption that an appeal to genc;r~~
principles is intended as apology for an evasion of strict law,12-it
will be remarked at the outset, that the guiding principle of maritime ·
warfare thus laid down by the Court is scarcely in accord with the
accepted doctrine that a maritime belligerent may subject neutral
trade to restrictions only in so far as it obstructs operations of war.
Those practices which interfere more widely with neutral traffic,
such as commercial blockade or the interdiction of colonial or coasting trade, either are regarded as abnormal exceptions to the rule or
are expressly condemned by the authorities.13 However, this point
need not be pressed too far. For with the increased integration of
all national activities as auxiliary to the conduct of war in recent
times, it may become necessary to extend the rule in order to recognize the intimate connection between military operations and civilian
commerce.
:n [1918], P. 182, 202.

"This, in the words of Historicus, is "the well-known resort of an advocate who
feels that the facts and the law are dead against him, and who is- about to imite the
court to overrule an Act of Parliament." Letters on International Law, 131.
13 To refer only to two authorities, representative of different schools, see Hall, International Law, (6th ed.), 75, 625, and Bonfils-Fauchille, Manuel, (ed. 1914), 1052.
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But, even so, the fact that the laws of contraband and blockade
have, within limits, been elaborated, would, it seems, constitute no
precedent in an English prize court for discarding those regulation!'
in their entirety and devising an admittedly different method i
interfering with neutral trade with the enemy, even though the object in view be identical. The difficulty with the line of reasoning
followed by the Court in The Leonora, if international law is really
a species of law and· not merely a fluctuating statement of international policy, may be perfectly illustrated by an analogous case. A
given person can reach a certain point by one of two pubiic highways. Would he then be justified in trespassing upon his neighbor's
land in order to reach the same point? Yet the object in view in
each of. the three possible courses he might take would obviously be
the same. To argue that a coun by exhibiting a similarity of ends
may enforce a dissimilar means, hitherto illegal, is in effect to arrogate to the court a power of legislation which, as we have recently
been reminded in The Zamora, 14 pertains alone to Parliament.
There is still a further consideration. The rule was laid down by
Lord KENYON in Pollard v. Bell,15 that "it is not competent to one
nation to add to the law of nations by its own arbitrary ordinances
without the concurrence of other nations." It is difficult, indeed, to
see how the pertinency of this rule to the present case can be denied
in view of the protests which have emanated from neutral and enemy
against the Orders in Council and in the face of the admission in the
judgment that the Orders are not as yet accepted law.
In short, the law of sea warfare, like any other system of law,
cannot be said to consist of "guiding principles" which may be
warped at discretion by the court, but of definite compromises reached after controvers.y between neutral and belligerent.
The second ground upon which the decision proceeds is that the
Order in Council. of February 16, 1917, is a legitimate measure of
retaliation against the illegal methods of warfare pursued by the
enemy. Of course, if this is to be accepted as the true basis for the
decision, and so it seems to be intended, the prec~ding remarks of the
Court as to the extensibility of maritime law by a prize tribunal may
be disregarded at once as dicta, which should perhaps 1>e described
as dangerous. For a plea of r~taliation is unnecessary, if the
measure thereby defended be itself legitimate.
" [1916], 2 A. C. 77, 90.
m 8 T. R. 434, 437, and see Bird v. Appleton, 8 T. R. 562, 567, and The Prometheus.
2. Hong-Kong Law Reports, 217. This was also the view of Lord Eldon and of Lord
Erskine, Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, X, 474, 935. The rule referred to in Pollard

v. Bell seems to have been laid down by Lord Mansfield in Ma.y11e v. Walter, Park Ins.
363, although it does not appear in the report.
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And it is to be particularly noted, that the peculiar problem presented by the Order in Council under discussion in The Leonora,
as contrasted with the previous retaliatory Orders of March II, 1915,
and of January IO, 1917, is that the present Order under the guise of
laying stress upon the enemy contemplates a direct and grievous
interference with neutral trade, which is equivalent to an assumption
of control over neutral commerce and the result of which is to penalize the neutral trader unless he acquiesces. This, with all respect to
the view of the Court, can only by a strained construction be described as consequential to operations of war undertaken against the
enemy. In fact, it is so extended an application of the alleged principle that in retaliation an enemy may be punished through the sides
of a neutral, that, to continue the metaphor, the neutral's sides have
'become the main object of attack and the effect on the enemy is but
secondary.
It may be admitted at once for the purposes of argument that
retaliation is admissible as between belligerents themselves, although
there is a tendency in the authorities to limit the right as strictly as
possible.16 This, however, leaves open the issue involved in The
Leonora. To what extent may the rights of neutrals thereby be affected? But before this can be touched upon, we have first to consider the theoretic basis of a doctrine of retaliation and in connection
therewith to determine the question whether a retaliatory measure
is properly cognizable in an English prize court.
Perhaps the most plausible theory is that retaliation is justifiable
upon grounds of self-preservation.17 If so, retaliation is in reality
an application of the broader principle that a State, when faced
with national extinction, may violate those rules, the observance of
which would jeopardize its existence. This doctrine has certain
implications, the first of which is that retaliation is not permissi•ble
per se, but only as an act of necessity. Thus the mere fact that one
10 See Hall, 4II; Oppenheim, II, 305; Lorimer, Institutes, II, 75.
11 Although neither develops the doctrine, this seems to be the view of Hall in the
passage just cited, 4II, and of Bonfils-Fauchille, 728, as well as of Historicus, 95. Com·
pare the statement of Chitty,
"The absolute rights of neutrals may be summed up in the terms of the
rule which has been before mentioned, 'that a neutral is not to be placed in a
worse situation by the war, than that in which he would have remained if
peace had continued uninterrupted.' To this rule of absolute right the urgent
necessities of war form the only exception," 187.
And see the statement o{. Sir William Scott quoted in note 21.
This view seems also to be implied in the argument of the Crown counsel in The
Leo11ora, and perhaps will serve to explain why the Court in that case took pains to
delineate the necessity under which Great Britain lay of retaliating against Germany's
submarine campaign, [1918], P. 182, 186, 194, 228.
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belligerent has violated a rule, will not justify the other in a corresponding non-observance of law, unless, indeed, the original violation
reduces the retaliating party' to a state of urgent necessity. Further,
the justification for an act of retaliatory necessity must be regardr l
as moral rather than legal in character. To be sure, the principle
is to be admitted on equitaoble grounds that necessity exempts from
the observance of law. But the acts taking place in pursuance of
this principle would in any case remain extra-legal, for the determination of the circumstances under which the necessity of retaliation
arises and of the measures best adapted to meet the emergency, is
made on considerations of policy and not by rule of law. In the
words of Sir William Grant:
· "Persons entertained strange notions of the law of nations,
when they supposed that a nation could not perform an act of
vigour for its own preservation, without violating the rule of
its conduct. But this could not be a violation of the rule, for
the case was out of the rule." 18
Indeed, one may well hesitate to accept the principle of necessity,
even in its most extenuated form, as anything more than a moral,.
non-legal justification for the non-observance of law. For as there
is no other authority than the necessitous belligerent to determine
the cases in which the principle is to be applied, there arises an irresistible temptation to extend the meaning of necessity so as to include
military or commercial ends which are regarded as eminently desiralble.19 A reference to. the disapprobation which was evoked by
the plea of von Bethmann-Holweg in defence of the German violation of Belgian neutrality will illustrate the point.20
According to an alternative theory derived from the idea of
contract, international law depends upon assent, the final test of
which is observance. Hence, it is argued that non-observance of the
rules of war ruptures the implied agreement upon which the rules are
based and gives just occasion for extra-legal retaliation. Or in more
ancient language, the·contending parties are thrown back upon the
law of nature.n This conclusion, however, .is not admissible. In'" [1918), ·"P. 182, .213; Hansard, X, 336.
"'The German view on this point is expounded hy .Lueder in Holtzendorff, Handbuch, IV, .254· The passage is given at length in Westlake, Collected Papers • .2#
"' See Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European
·war, 438.
21 This appears to be Lueder's view in the passage just cited.
Note also the statement by Sir Wllliam Scott, that "the law of nations, which being in its nature conventional, was no longer binding than when the rules of this convention were adverted to
by all parties concerned. When they were departed from by one party, the other was
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ternational law is truly based in the recognized practices of civilized
States, in which there may be implied an agreement. But this agreement is one to which the members of the whole group are parties,
and is not to be described as a series of disparate contracts between
individual States. As a result non-observance of recognized law by
a State, unless concurred in by the entire group, will not of itself
relieve any other State of its duty to observe the. law. Othenvise,
we come to the preposterous conclusion that the effect of a rule of
international law becomes nugatory at the discretion of a .single
State which chooses no longer to observe the rule.22
A third view is possible,-that retaliation is a penalty which is
laid upon a belligerent in case he violates the laws of war, and, thefefore, is essentially a legal sanction of these laws, enforceable in a
prize court.23 There ar~ grave objections to this theory. The first
is purely of a practical nature. As has been clearly demonstrated by
the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 and the European war of 1914, a disposition on the part of belligerents to reply in kind to violations of
the laws of war, is in effect to lower the struggle to the level of barbarism. A system of penalties, which instead of efficiently sanctioning encourages a disregard of the rules of war, cannot be recommended. And even on principle the doctrine appears objectiona:ble. In
the aibsence as yet of any real international government and according to the accepted view as to the equality of States, it may well be
questioned by what authority any State ca.n exact punishment from
another State for alleged violations of the law of nations. Can a
State, and this is involved in the principle, gratuitously retaliate
against violations of law by which it suffers no injury? It is subleft to the guidance of natural justice; and by the laws of natural justice retaliation
was authorized as an essential part of self-defence," Hansard, X, 1066.
But, even according to the rules of natural justice, it is extremely doubtful v.hethcr
in the prefent case the conclusions of Sir William Scott can ue upheld. See, for example, the view of Wolff expressly condemning the principle of "t.alio" as a portion
of the "jus gentium," Jus Gentium, cap. V, §§ 577-579, and the explicit statements of
Grotius,
"At talionem natura non admittit, nisi in ipsos qui · deliquerunt: neque
sufficit quod hostium unum quasi corpus fictione quadam intelligatur, ut ex iis
potest intelligi, quae de poenarum communicatione supra a nobis tractata sunt."
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. III, cap. XI, § XVI, :>, and of Bynkershoek,
"Retorsio non est nisi adversus eum, qui ipse damni quid dedit, ac deinde
patitur, non vero adversus communem amicum."
Quaestionum Juris Publici lib. l, cap. IV, 32.
22 See the observations of Westlake on this theory, International Law, \Var, l 14.
""This has the support of Westlake and, at least by implication, of Hall and Bonfils-Fauchille in the passage cited in notes 17 and 22. The two latter authorities, how·
ever, also admit the theory of necessity.
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mitted that retaliation must be limited to those cases· in which the
interests o~ a State are so affected as to justify an ~ct of necessity.u
The rule could not be better stated than in the words of an
eminent British authority:
"Reprisal" (here equivalent to retaliation), "or the punishment of one man for the acts of another, is a measure
in itself so repugnant to justice, and when hasty or excessive
is so apt to increase rather than ~bate the irregularities of a
war, that belligerents are universally considered to be bound
not to resort to reprisals except under the pressure of absolute necessity, and then not by way of revenge, but only in
cases and to the extent to which an enemy may be deterred
from a repetition of his offence." 2G
The conclusion, then, is that retaliation i~ an act of policy, not
law, and so· is scarcely cognizable in a court bound 'by international
law. For how can a court which is bound by the rule enforce an act
which is out of the rule? In The Leonora, however, the Court, in
order· to place retaliation on a legal basis, adopts the principle that
"the circumstances which call for acts of retaliation extend that law
(of nations) so as to cover and comprehend them within its
bounds." 26 This is difficult to follow. How can circumstances,
which are not legally determined, extend the rule of law? And, in
view of. what is implied in retaliation, i.e., non-observance of the
customary law of civilized States, it seems an obvious self-contradiction to maintain that the plea of retaliatory necessity can do more
than admit an exception in which that law does not apply. There is,
indeed, a species of sly humor in holding that when circumstances
suspend the operation of a series of rules, the rules still apply.
In truth, to admit the principle that retaliation-is cognizable in a
court of prize, will be seen, if the position of prize courts even in
Anglo-American jurisprudence be reflected upon, in substance to
constitute a State complainant, judge, and bailiff in its own cause. For
it will be recalled that, although upon the doctrine laid down in The
Zamora the Court may decide whether or not :retaliation is admissi.. These objections do not apply with quite the same force to the punishment of
"war crimes" by a belligerent, provided 'they are co.nmitted by enemy subjects and un·
authorized by their Government. iEven in these cases, however, the danger remains
that, particularly when the law of war admits of diverse conflicting interpretations, the
plea of retaliation will become simply the excuse for further illegality. And, in any
event, such jt.stice as is :r>teted out to the individual offender must proceed from an
authority, bo'th partial and irresponsible.
""Hall, 4n.
""[1918], P. J8z, zz6.
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ble, yet it is bound by the facts recited by the Executive to show that
a case for retaliation exists.27 This of course precludes the court
from inquiring as to whether in point of fact there is a proper case
for retaliation, since the all-important circumstances which render
retaliation admissible cannot be disputed. The logical solution of
the difficulty, if the plea of retaliation is to ·be admitted in court, is
frankly to grant that a court of prize, in so far as it gives effect to a
retaliatory measure, is acting, not as a court of international law:
but as an administrative organ, subject to executive direction.
Let us for the nonce waive the point that retaliation, even as
between belligerents, is non-legal and, therefore, non-cognizable at.
law, and, granting its legality, examine the further question to what
extent the rights of neutrals may be thereby affected. As to this
it may be laid down that on a strict interpretation the circumstances
of a dispute to which neutrals are hot parties cannot diminish or
augment neutral rights. 28 And assuredly none of the theories of
retaliation affords ground for the contention that as an incident to
retaliatory measures a belligerent may deprive neutrals of the
enjoyment of their recognized rights. For how in all justice can an
innocent party, which is responsi,ble neither for the existence of war
nor for the non-observance of its rules, legally be made to suffer for
the infraction of those rules by a belligerent? In answer to the
point which might possibly be raised in this connection, that neutrals
appearing within the sphere of military operations are liable to
suffer loss, it may be stated that this rule applies to legitimate acts.
of war and not to retaliatory measures. It is not contended here
that a belligerent may not extend the war to neutrals or that in case
of extreme necessity an infringement of neutral rights may not be
considered as morally justifiable, though of course giving rise to
legitimate claims on the part of the neutral. As in the analogous
t:ase of requisitions, the neutral is to be compensated for his loss.29
21 [1916], :z A. C.·77, 98.
""See, for example, the clear statement of this principle in the instructions of
Bryan to Page, '.March 30, 1915, Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with
Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce, (May :z7, 1915), at
page 70:"If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should
prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war
sanctioned by enlightened nations, it can not be su9posed, and this Government
does not for a moment suppose, that His Majesty's Government would wish
the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts
as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in
so far as they affect neutral rights."
:z9 See Chitty, 187, and the authorities cited in The Zamora, [1916], 2 A. C. 77, 100.
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Therefore, it must be insistently urged that, unless the neutral
identifies himself to some degree with one or the other belligerent
and to that extent loses his neutral character, no violation o_f international law by either belligerent will legitimize such retaliatory ir terference with neutral rights as in effect penalizes the neutral ror
their exercise.
On the other hand, if we admit the principle that necessity exempts from the observance of law, it must rbe added that necessary
acts of retaliation may not unreasonably entail on neutrals a certain
amount of inevitable inconvenience, though even here neutral claims
should not be precluded. For under such circumstances as give
rise to retaliation, the strict letter of one right may not be insisted
upon to prevent the exercise of another right, however uncongenial
the compromise may appear to abstract justice.
This rule is in substance laid down in the course of the elaborate
dicta in The Zamora:
"An Order authorizing reprisals will •be conclusive as to the
facts which are recited as showing that a case for reprisals
exists, and will have due weight as showing what, in the opinion of His Majesty's advisers, are the best or only means of
meeting the emergency; buf this will not preclude the right
of any party aggrieved to contend, or the right of the court
to hold, that these means_ are unlawful, as entailing on neutrals a degree of inconvenience unreasonable, considering all
the circumstances of the case."30
Probably the decision in The Stigstad, 81 that the detention of a
neutral ship for twenty-two days was necessary to the application of
the Order in Council of March II, r9r5, and hence no claim could
be allowed in respect of the detention, could be brought under the
principle laid down· in The Zamora on the ground that the incon·venience to the neutral trader was not unreasonable.
It is significant, however, that in The Stigstad82 the Court bases
its decision upon a principle bearing much more hardly upon the
neutral:
"In the result," it is stated, "I am of opinion that the Order
in Council is lawful as an Order enjoining reprisals in accordance with the principles of international law. The .result,
in my opinion, is that whatever delay or inconvenience is inao [1916], 2 A. C. 77, 98.
111 [1916], P. 123.
12 [1916], P. 123.
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evitably or necessarily caused, as in this case, must be suffered by neutrals, as the consequence of the exercise of legitimate belligerent rights on the part of this country."33
And in The Le.onora, substantially the same view is maintained:
"If, in view of the whole situation between the belligerents,
the means for carrying it (i.e., an Order in Council) into effect are not excessive or unreasonable against the enemy, the
consequential results to neutrals desiring or willing to trade
with the enemy give such neutrals no right to complain, or to
claim compensation."34

The dictum in The Zamora, which has the support of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, may be taken as a fair statement
of the law. However, it leaves open the important question, What
is a reasonable interference with neutral rights? It will be noted
that the rule adopted in The Leonora, which bears directly upon this
point, in reality begs the whole question, unless neutral rights are
non-existent. To paraphrase the ratio decisionis,-"If the circumstances between the belligerents, apart from the consideration of
neutral rights, justify retaliation, then any consequential interference with neutral rights is legitimate." But the whole problem is,
whether the circumstances, including the inevitable loss to neutrals,
permit the agoption of a particular method of retaliation. We must,
therefore, conclude that tl!is decision cannot be supported either on
the authority of the rule laid down in The Zamora or, in view of the
preceding observations, on principle. This is quite apart from the
suggestion already made, that, upon the facts presented in The Leonora, the retaliation does seem consequential to tqe interference
with neutral trade rather than the converse.
There is another aspect to the question. If one belligerent strikes
at his opponent through a violation of neutral rights, in what cases
and to what extent may the injured belligerent retaliate in kind
through "the sides of the neutral?" And if this question be resolved
in favor of the belligerent, can that belligerent, in order to enforce
his retaliatory measures, legitimately refuse compensation to the
neutral for the violation of his rights which necessarily accompanies
the measures of retaliation? The case is a difficult one, since in each
instance the decision must rest largely upon its particular circumstances.
" [19161, P. 123, 129.
•• [1913], P. 182, 228.
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It may be laid down, in the first place, however, that the violation
of neutral rights by one belligerent in itself gives the other belligerent no right to int~rfere. 35 This principle, which is a necessary corollary of the immunity of neutral States, h:;i.s been clearly demonstrated oy Historicus. To quote his statement:
-

"The right which is injured iby the act of the offending
belligerent is the right of the neutral Government, and not
that of the other belligerent. The important consequence of
this proposition is, that it is the neutral, and not the belligerent, who is strictly entitled to claim or to enforce the remedy."36
According to this principle, the ground for retaliation is not the
interference with neutral rights, ·but the consequent injury to belligerent interests. It is, therefore, from the neutral point of view
prima. facie illegal, for the necessity of the belligerent cannot deprive the neutral of his rights.
On the other hand, in return for the privilege of immunity, the
neutral State is under a duty to maintain strict impartiality in its
conduct towards both belligerent parties. Consequently, a neutral
State, which acquiesces in the violation of its rights by one belligerent, must concede the same liberties to the other, or else forfeit its
neutral position.37 The rule is thus stated by Manning:
"If one belligerent attempts to injure his enemy, by acts
which violate the rights of neutrals, and if these neutrals
offer no resistance to such violation, it cannot be expected
that the other belligerent shall submit to be attacked in this
manner without retaliating upon his enemy ·by similar measures."38
05 See on this point the exhaustive article, "Belligerent Violation of Neutral Rights,''
by Historicus, 149, and the authorities therein cited. This work, written by W. G. Ver·
non-Harcourt, is of especial value in the present connection, as it appeared at a time
when Great Britain was interested rather in the definition of neutral rights than in
the exercise of belligerent power.
F. E. Smith, however, takes the line, that "if a neutral Government enjoys as
regards one of the belligerents a right, it is bound, as regards the other, to enforce
it." International Law, (4th ed.), 202. This; in view of the authorities cited by Historicus, must be regarded very doubtful as a gener:il principle. Indeed, the implication
in Art. 5, The Hague Convention V, 1907, which applies the rule only to certain speci·
lied cases, is to deny its universal application. See also the instructions of Jefferson
to Morris, American State Papers, I, 168. In any event, it will not support the further
proposition that the duty may be legally enforced on the peutral by retaliatory illegality.
M Historicus, 1 52..
31 See, fot' example, the statements of ·Lord Erskine, Hansard, X, 938, which are in
substance followed by Chitty, 151.
""Commentaries, 347.
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This much is clear. There remains, however, the prime difficulty
of defining the circumstances under which a neutral so acquiesces
in the violation of his rights by one belligerent to the detriment of
the other, as to legitimize retaliation. Strictly speaking, nothing but
a departure from the line of impartiality marked out for the neutral
will support this conclusion. But the truth is that in the term, "acquiescence," there lurks a,n ambiguity which has given rise to much
dispute. Thus the term may imply (I) concession of privilege to
the enemy, whether or no fraudulently concealed, as of the right to
pass enemy troops over neutral territory, (2) tacit acceptance of the
situation arising from disregard of neutral rights, covered by pro·
fonna protest, (3) inability on the part of the neutral to restrain
the enemy from violating neutral rights, even though protest be
made bona fide and with all the diplomatic means at the neutral's
disposal. If there be proof of some sort of agreement between neutral and enemy, as in the first case, the matter is of course settled at
once. Nor can it be doubted that "A tame and spiritless submission
to infractions of his rights would justly expose the neutral to the
imputation of connivance with the party at whose hands they were
sustained,"39 and, it may be added, of allying himself with that
party. Even here, however, the neutral may be a:ble to show tha,t
submission was made under stress of urgent necessity, and in that
case could claim redress for the injury resulting from belligerent
acts of retaliation. For the neutral, in the first instance, was made
by force majeure to hold his rights in abeyance, and, therefore, the
injured belligerent, retaliating under plea of urgent necessity, cannot consistently deny the pertinency of the same plea to the case of
the neutral's acquiescence, the more so as the belligerent acquires
no corresponding legal right through the violation of neutral rights
by his opponent.40 But, on the other hand, it cannot be maintained,
as the German Government has contended, that neutral powers,
which satisfy themselves with theoretical protests against violations
of their rights, actually admit "the vital interests of a belligerent as
a sufficient excuse for methods of waging war of whatever description."41 Still less can the further proposition be supported that
a neutral. which has bona fide protested unsuccessfully against infractions of its rights by a belligerent, should •be denied compensation for retaliatory infractions of it~ rights by the opposing belliger.. Historicus, 159.
40 See Phillimore, III, 249.
41
Memorial of German Government, February 4, i9x5. Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Betligerent Goverliments relating to Neutral Rights and Com·
merce, (May 27, x915), 53.
·
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ent. In a conflict of any magnitude, the effect of these principles
would be to place the neutral in a dilemma from which he could
scarcely be e.,'{tricated in honor ·without casting off a precarious neutrality: the neutral either must go to war to defend his rights or submit to increasingly severe and dishonorable measures of retaliation
and counter-retaliation, until his position is that of a shuttlecock
buffeted between two adversaries. The self-sacrifice of Belgium at
Liege, however heroic, cannot be laid down as the measure of a
neutral's duties in this regard, unless, indeed, we are to do away with
neutrality.
In short, as between the belligerent and the neutral, retaliation
must be based upon the theory of the conflict of interests. 42 In view
of the µnsatisfactory nature of the law upon this point, it is perhaps permissible to indicate the lines upon which an equitable compromise might proceed. On the side of the belligerent, if a broad
view be taken of the practices of States at war, it must be admitted
as a legal principle that necessity exempts from the observance of
law. Therefore, necessitous retaliation lby one belligerent against
the illegal practices of the other, is permissible even though consequential injury be thereby inflicted upon neutral rights.43 But from
the neutral's point of view, which is also that of strict justice, the
application of this principle must 'he limited to the least possible
extent. Thus, in the first place, the necessity for retaliation must be
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation," 44 and, it is to be added, involving not
merely the furtherance of desirable strategic or commercial ends
'but _even national existence. Further, nothing short of a positive
departure from strict impartiality on the part of the neutral will
legitimize retaliation "through the sides of the neutral." In view of
42 See 'Vestlake, International Law, War, 166.
A somewhat similar theory lies at
the basis of the law of maritime insurance on a contraband voyage. See Barker v.
Blakes, 9 East 282, 292. The analogy is, however, not complete for in the case of
marine insurance there is involved a conflict of rights, whilst in the case of retaliation
the conflict is between a necessitous act and neutral right. ·
'"No apodictic statement is here intended as to the legitimacy of necessity. For
the final decision upon that mooted point, the reader is left to decide between Lueder
and Westlake. See passages referred to in note 19. All that is proposed is, that, in
consideration of the practice of States as the accepted basis of international law, some
legal meaning must be given to necessity, but, further, that it must be limited to creating
exceptions to the rule of law, without at the same time implying that the extra-legal
acts of necessity occurring within the exceptions are thereby legitimized. In other
words, necessity may destroy duties but cannot create rights. At first sight, this tlis·
tinction will doubtless appear to smack slightly of scholasticism, but it results from the
fact that international law is not a complete system of logically developed principles,
but is largely constituted of compromises effected between conflicting principles.
"Webster to Ashburton, August 6, 1842, to be found in Webster's Works, VI, 301;
Moore, Digest, II, 412.
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the fact that a neutral has a direct interest in the preservation of its
rights, there should be a legal presumption that a neutral, protesting
against violations of its rights, is acting in good faith and, hence,
fully entitled to insist upon them. The equivocal term, "acquiescence,'' should, therefore, be discarded in favor of the rule laid down
by Dr. Laurence to define the cases in which a neutral has compromised its privilege :
"It was not what was expressed by the ministers, an acquiescence in the orders of the enemy (if such had ·been the
fact), but an adherence to the cause of the enemy, which was
the legitimate ground of measures of retaliation." 45
Finally, in no case is the inability of the neutral to prevent infractions of his rights, whether arising from weakness or un.willingness to go to war on the issue, to be made the ground for depriving
the neutral of the redress to which he is entitled.
It is unnecessary to insist upon the obvious application of these
principles to the decision in The Leonora.
The Court, however, has still another barb left in its quiver. A
definition of neutrality is adopted, which, in the present case, imputes to the neutral a breach of impartiality. In the words of Lord
Howick, approved by the Court,
"Neutrality properly considered does not consist in taking
advantage of every situation between ibelligerent States, by
which emolument may accrue to the neutral, whatever may
be the consequences to either belligerent party; but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford
advantage in the war to either; and particularly in so far
restraining its trade to the accustomed course which it held
in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one belligerent
in escaping the effect of the other's hostilities." 46
In ~he present development of the law of neutrality,-and it may
be seriously questioned whether in 18o7 the e:i: parte statement by
Lord Howick of British claims, though subscribed to by some English authorities,47 was generally acceptable,-this doctrine is inadmissible. The duty of impartiality imposed on a neutral State is,
with well-defined exceptions in which unneutral acts occurring on
neutral territory are to be prohibited, strictly of a negative charac"Hansard, X, 1067.
,
•• [1918], P. 182, 207. The note from Lord Howick to Mr. Rist, Jl{arcb 17, 1807,
will be found in Hansard, X, 402.
•t See for example Chitty, 156.
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ter,4 8 and to extend the obligation as in the present case would in
effect require the neutral to assist belligerents in the prosecution of
their warlike measures. The theory that a neu1ral must limit himself quantitatively to the "accustomed trade" of peace, runs counter
to the recognized principle that a neutral subject commits no illegality in trading with the enemy :49 in particular, it would in large
measure prevent the legitimate sale of munitions of war by neutral
subjects, which notoriously develops enormously during periods of
hostilities. 5 ° Further, the theory proves too much, for it would necessarily rule out the restrictions which a belligerent may lawfully
impose on neutral traders by blockade or contraband.51 And the
practical difficulties which the neutral State would face in enforcing
the rule are well-nigh insuperable, aside from the problem of determining precisely in each case what is the "accustomed trade." Is the
neutral State to keep a spy in each counting-house and a fleet on
every sea to prevent its subjects engaged in trade from exceeding the
"accustomed" limits? Or, if this is impracticable, to lay an embargo
on its shipping? Nor, if we adopt the view accepted by the Court,
can we escape the conclusion that, in order to prevent neutral evasions of the rule, the belligerent must necessarily have an intolerable
right of interference in every act of neutral commerce.52 In short,
there is no principle of law or justice by which a neutral, who has to
suffer by war, may not also derive what profit he can from the circumstances of a dispute in which he bears no responsibility.
In this connection, a misconception in the argument for the Crown
should be noted,-that "Neutral carriers must be strictly impartial:
• 8 See Art. 5, The Hague Convention V, 19on Westlake, International Law, War,
cap. VU, 161 ff. and Collected Papers, ·381 •
.. See authorities cited in note 7. The objection here made to the rule as stated
by Lord Howick is, that from its context it hr.plies an attempt to limit neutrals not only
qualitatively but quantitatively to their trade in time of peace.
It should, however, be noted that the rule is susceptible of another interpretation,
thus set forth by Lord Stowell in The Immannel, ·
"The general rule is, that the neutral has a right to carry on, in time of
war, l1is accustomed trade, to the utmost extent of which that accustomed trade
is capable," 2 Rob 197, 198.
This was also the view of Lord Erskine, Hansard, X, 936. But it is rejected by
both Hall, 633. and Westlake, International Law, War, 254, on the ground that neutrals
have a prima facie right to engage in trade of any description, at least until the bellig. erent can show that operations of war are thereby 11bstructed.
""See Art. 7, The Hague Convention V, 1907, and the instructions of Lansing to
Peufield, August 12, 1915, Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and Duties, (October 21, 1915), i94.
01 See Westlake, International Law, War, 255.
152 Tl1e analogous proposal that neutral States should be under a duty to prevent
the export of contraband of war meets with similar objections at the hands of Histori·
cus, 134.
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and must not encourage those who commit gross breaches of the
law •by continuing to trade with them." 53 This contention may be
met by a simple traverse. The duty of impartiality applies only to
the neutral Government, not to its subjects.54 Nor can a neutral
State under the guise of trade prohibitions take issue with one side
or the other without to that extent abandoning its neutrality. 55
There can be no dispute upon this matter. These are not doctrines
of neutrality. According to the most authoritative of recent English
writers on international law;"Neutrality enjoins abstinence from taking part in any
operations of war, and from interfering with any operation
of war which is legitimate as between the belligerents, but not
aobstinence from anything merely because it strengthens a
belligerent." 56
VIe must, therefore, conclude, in the absence of any showing that
the Dutch Government had failed in its neutrality, that the decision
in The J,eonora, at least in so far as neutral property was condemned because a neutral subject exercised his just rights, is not in
accordance with international law.
B. "The precedents relied upon in favour of the present
Order are the Orders in Council of January 7 and November
II, I807, 57 promulgated during the Napoleonic war in answer
to Napoleon's celebrated Berlin and Milan Deci;ees of Novem. ber 2I, I8o6, and December 17, 1807 ;58 reliance is also placed
on some decisions relating to those Orders." 59

As the decision in The Leonora is based thus squarely upon precedent, an examination, however brief, of the relevancy of the Orders
a [1918), P. 182, r90.
,
"'See for example Hall, 77; Kleen, Neutralite, l, :zo8, and compare Westlake, In·
ternational Law, War, 166•
.. See the reply of Bryan to Senator Stone, January 20, 1915, Department of State,
Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and
Duties, (October 21, 1915), 59, 63 •
.. \Vestlake, International Law, War, 163.
n These Orders in Council will be found in Hansard, X, 126, 1.1.J; 49 Annual Reg·
ister (1807) 671, 746. See also Phillimore, III, 4u; Edwards Reports, Appendbc v, vi.
The Berlin Decree will be found in English translation in Edwards, App. vii. The
various papers relating to the so-called "Continental System," are collected in Martens;
Nouveau Recueil, I, 433. An excellent sketch is given by Manning, cap. X, 330. ~
also,Historicu's, 109 ff, and Mahan, The Influence of Sea·Power upon the French Revolu·
tion and Empire, II, cap. XVIII, 272 ff.
· .. -Unl~s the report in The Leonora is inaccurate at this point, the learned President
was evidently nodding, for the Orders in Council referred to could not possibly have
been issued in reply to the -Milan Decree of later date•
.. [1918), P. 182, 209.
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in Council of 1807, together with the decisions rendered under them,
to the present case and of their legitimacy, cannot well be avoided.
It will be recalled that the Berlin Decree, declaring a paper 1blockade
of the British Isles, was issued by Napoleon in retaliation against
certaiin methods of sea-warfare pursued by England, which, according to the French view, were not in conformity with the law of
nations. 60 In reply, the British Order in Council of January 7, 1807,
was issued providing "that no vessel shall be permitted to trade from
one port to another, both of which shall belong to, or be in the possession of, France or her allies, or shall be so far under their controul, as that British vessels may not trade thereat." 61 Neutral vessels acting in contravention of this Order, together with their cargoes, w.ere rendered liable to condemnation.
The Order of January 7, 1807, proved ineffective and, consequently, on November I I a further Order was issued subjecting neutral
trade to still more rigorous restriction. In addition to declaring,
much as did the Order of January 7, that the ports of France and
her allies and of their colonies should "be subject to the same restrictions in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions herein-after mentioned, 62 as if the same were actually blockaded by his
majesty's naval forces, in the most strict and rigorous manner," 63
it was ordered,
"That all trade in articles which are of the produce or
manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed and considered· to 'be unlawful; and that every vessel
trading from or to the said countries or colonies, together with
all goods ·and merchandis~ on 1board, and all articles of the
produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies,
shall be captured, and condemned as prize to the captors." 64
The similiarity between the situations underwhich the Orders in
Council of 1807 and those of 1915 and 1917 were issued, is obvious.
In each case attempts to enforce an illegitimate system of blockade,
purporting to be a measure of retaliation against the maritime practices of Great Britain, provoked further retaliatory measures on her
part which provided an effective means of control over neutral commerce. The only important difference between the two cases in the
.. See the preamble to the Berlin Decree, Edwards, App. vii.
•1 Edwards, App. vi•
.. These exceptions are to be found in Arts. 4·6 of the Order, Edwards, App. xiv.
They nre well summarized by Manning, 339•
.. Art 1, Edwards, App. xiii.
&1 Art. 2, Edwards, App. xiii.
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opinion of Sir Samuel Evans 6 s is the fact that Germany had in her
hands a novel weapon of maritime warfare, the· submarine: this,
however, apart from those considerations of humanity which are
after all paramount, gave to Germany a means for rendering her
blockade effective in a degree to which Napoleon· could never attain.
This, however, does not dispose of the matter, for two questions
of equal importance remain to be decided. First, is there sufficient
analogy 1between the Orders in Council of l8o7 and the Order of
1917 to admit the former as legal precedent? Secondly, if so, were
the Orders of 1807 justifiable applications of international law?
It is to be observed at the outset that, in so far as the Orders in
Council of 1807 restricted intercourse with belligerent ports or ports
in enemy control, they afford scant precedent for the decision in
Tlte Leonora. For, if regard be had to the maritime practices of that
period, they may be defended as not inadmissible extensions of the
laws of blockade. Whereas, the Order of 1917 applies in so many
words to neutral ports66 and cannot, therefore, except by an impossible construction be thus considered. In fact, it may be stated at
once that the Order in Council of January 7, r8o7, at least is not in
point. It restrained neutrals from undertaking in collusion with the
enemy a colonial and coasting trade to which they were not entitled
in time of peace· and, hence, according to the practice of the English
prize courts of that time, came under the "Rule of 1756."67 It is to
lbe noted that, although the preamble to the Order recites that a just
occasion for retaliation had arisen, the Order itself is not described
as retaliatory. It was, therefore, regarded as a legitimate act of war
and not a measute of retaliation. 68
Subject to the preceding observation, the Order in Council· of
November II, 1807, may 'be fairly described as a retaliatory measure
largely similar to the Order of February 16, "1917. Each declared
trade in enemy goods unlawful and strbjected vessels engaged in this
trade together with their ca.rgoes to condemnation: each, requiring
ships to touch at British ports, admitted exceptions to the general
rule, in the one case by license, in the other after submission of the
vessel to examination.
But an act of state, such as an Order in Council, is of course
no legal precedent unless supported by authority. We are, therefore, left to decide whether the Order in Council of November, l8o7,
.. [1918], P. 182, 209.
ea .<\rt. l, [1918], P. 182, 183.
01

See the authorities referred to by Chitty, cap. V, 153 ff., and Phillimore, III,

312-314.
88
1

See the speech of Lord Erskine, Hansard, X, 946, and Chitty, 159·
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was regarded as legal, or whether we may not rather conclude with
Manning, an English writer who cannot be accused of unfairness
towards British maritime pretensions, that
"The hardships then (in the Napoleonic wars) inflicted
upon neutrals were neither consistent with the Law of the
Nations, nor were they regarded at the time as any thing more
than exceptions justified rby the exigency of the conjuncture,
nor can they be ever appealed to as precedents by any future
governments whatever." 69
Nothing, in fact, could more clearly set forth the precarious basis
of precedent upon which the decision in The Leonora rests than the
nature of the authorities in which the Court seeks refuge. Instead
of relying upon writers, such as Manning or Phillimore,7° who, removed from the immediate circumstances under which the Orders
of 1807 were issued, after impartial consideration pronounce them
contrary to international law, the Court introduces ex parte statements of ministers made in Parliament in support of measures for
which they were responsible. Let us, however, grant the impartiality and authority of these statements and examine their effect. Of
the ministers or ex-ministers quoted by the Court, three, Sir William
Grant, 71 Sir John Nicholl,1 2 and Sir William Scott73 defend the
Order of November, r8o7, whilst Lord Erskine74 and Dr. Laurence75
maintain its illegality. All admit the right of ret-aliation; but Lord
Ersklne alone holds the view that a measure of retaliation is consistent with international law. Even the ministers of the Crown
named above, those interested in defending the Order, concede that
it is an extra-legal act of necessity, justifiable only on first principles.
Nor does the statement of Lord Erskine necessarily involve the
principle that, according to international law, a neutral may be denied redress for injury following upon retaliation against the enemy,
unless of course he has acquiesced in the enemy's measures.76 The
result of the5e doubtful authorities is anything but conclusive. _
.. Commentaries, 322.
•• International Law, III, 250. See also the view of Historicus, 95,
"The Orders in Council then were an exceptional and temporary violation
of the admitted law of nations, brought about by the original outrage of the
Berlin Decree."
"It [1918], P. 182, 213; Hansard, X, 331, 336.
12 [1918], P. t82, 214; Hansard, X, 667, 674.
Ta [1918], P. 182, 216; Hansard, X, 1066.
•• [1918], P. 182, 217; Hansard, X, 929 ff.
"'Referred to, [1918], P. 182, 213; Hansard, X, 331, 1067.
•• [1918], P. 182, 219; Hansard, x; 929, 938.
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Let us extricate ourselves from this parliamentary morass and return to legal terra ftrma. The Court in The Leonora regards it as
significant that no decision of a British prize court can be cited
against the validity of the Orders in Council of 1807.11 This fact
will not seem so compelling when it is recalled that in The Fo:-c Sir
William Scott held, and this was also the view of Sir William
Grant,7 8 that the Orders were declarations of international law,
binding upon the court.79 And Lord Erskine, who maintained the
principle which has been adopted in The Zamora that Orders in
Council are not conclusive as a statement of international law,
nevertheless considered the Order of November, 1807, to be binding
on the prize court by reason of the facts recited in the preamble.80
Therefore, the issue involved in The Leonora, the legality of re·
[191.~J,

n

P. 182, 222.

The statement of Sir William Grant is as follows:
"The Orders in Council did not, could not, alter the law of nations. The
king might issue his declaration, because he was not to leave his courts to infer
what was the\ law of nations, but the king's declaration did not alter the law
oi nations, hut was to be justified by that law . • • When the crown was in•
tntsled with the power of making war, it should not be deprived of the means
of carrying it on with vigour and effect," Hansard, X, 335•
., The Fox, Edwards 3JJ, 312.
The point is simply, that, whatever may be the present status of the law, in the
cases occurring under the Orders in Council of l 807, the court regarded them as bind•
ing declarations of international law which it would not permit to be disputed, and,
therefore, never decided t!ie question as to their legality. The dicta in Thi! Fox, Ed·
wards, 3n, 312·314, if they mean anything, establish this as the vkw of Lord Stowell.
And, with all deference, the color which is given by Lord Parker of Waddington to
The Fox, as deciding that "there was nothing inconsistent with the law of nations in
certain Orders in Council made by way of reprisals for the Berlin 2nd Milan Decrees,
though if there had been no case for reprisals the Order would not have been justified 1'y
international Jaw," The Zamora, [1916], 2 A. C. 77, 94, must be described as most extra·
ordinary, as it appears on the face of the judgment in The Fox that the legality of
retaliation was not in issue, The Fox, Edwards, 3u, 312, 314! Nor does the statement
of Lord Stowell in The Maria, that the Court was "to administer with indifference that
justice which the law of nations holds out without distinction to inder1endent states,
some happening to be neutral and some belligerent," The Maria, 1 Rob 340, 350, con·
fiict with this view, for no Order in Council was there involved. And in The L11cv
Edwards, 122, Lord Stowell did no more than construe an Order in Council confo~.
ably to its intention.
This contention, of c01irse, in no wise involves a discussion of the further question
whether the dicta in The Zamora arc not to be preferred to the dicta in The Fo:o.
as an interPretation of the rule laid down in the Answer too the Prussian, Memorial, that,
by the law of England, "all captures at sea, as prize, in time of war, must be judged
of in a court of admiralty, according to the law of nations. and particular treaties,
where there are any.'' Collectanea Juridica, I, 129, 152. It may be observed, however,
that in neither case is the rule applied absolutely; in either view, a statute is held to
hind the court of prize; and an Order in Council is, according to Lord Stowell, irrehuttable evidence both of the facts recited and of the law of nations; according to Lord
Parker, it is conclusive .as to the facts, but only highly presumptive evidence as to the
78

0

Jaw.
80

Hansard, X, 958.
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taliation, was never and, indeed, could not be decided by the Court.
Nor can the dictum in The Snipe, that
"These orders were intended and professed to be retaliatory
against France; without reference to that character, they have
not, q,nd would not have been defended; but in that character
they have been justly, in my apprehension, deemed reconcilable with those rules of natural justice, by w!iich the international communication of independent states is usually govemed,"81
afford a basis for the conclusion reached in The Leonora, for
i~tema.tional law is no longer inclusive of natural justice.
It thus appears that the decision in The Leonora is not well-founded in precedent, even on the authorities which are cited by the Court.
Therefore, it will be unnecessary to advert to two important points,
which were not considered by the Court, first, whether the fact that
the retaliatory decrees of Napoleon gave rise to legitimate claims
on the part of the United States which were recognized by France
in 1831,82 is not pr,l!cedent for the principle that acts of retaliation
are illegal as against neutrals and, secondly, whether the law of
neutral rights has not possibly developed !beyond the stage which it
had reached during the Napoleonic era and, therefore, precedents
of that period should not be accepted without reference to more recent authority.
The preceding examination of legal principle and precedent,:.__
and it should be remarked in passing that no criticism of British
maritime policy is hereby implied,-has terminated rather disastrously for the decision in The Leonora. The result has been simply
to rule the plea of retaliation out of court. Hence, the attempt in
The Le_onora to place retaliation upon a legal basis and, consequently, to regard the injury to neutrafs which is involved in measures
of retaliation as damnum absque injuria,83 must he rejected._ It is
· worse than sheer nonsense to maintain that ·retaliatory violation of
law is no violation, since it encourages the exercise of undisciplined,
brute force. Such justification as may be found in cases of retaliation must be placed on the ground of absolute necessity, and neither
.
61 The Snipe, Edwards, 380, 381

.

The !question might, of course, be raised whether
retaliation through "the sides of a neutral" is justifiable even on first principles or by
natural justice. See for example, Phillimore, m, 250; Historicus, 94; Lorimer, II, 75;
and tlte authorities referred to in note 21.
82 In Art. l, Treaty of Paris, July 4, 1831; 19 British and Foreign State Papers, 594.
83 This statement of the effect of justifiable retaliation upon neutral rights is made
by Lord Eldon, Hansard, X, 992,
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deprives the neutral of his right, nor, if it is violated, of his claim to
redJi.ess.
In truth, it may be suggested,-although these things should not
be whispered out of court,-that the learned President was in a
grievous predicament. On the one hand, he was tethered to vihat
may be termed the legal fiction that a municipal court is, in the
absence of statutory direction, to apply the common law of nations
even as against an executive order :84 on the· other, every instinct of
patriotism strained against a declaration that the policy deemed
a'bsolutely essential to the vital interests of the British Empire should
be condemned as not in conformity with that law. · Therefore, the
atttempt to convert illegality into legality. But why should the court
be required to sit in judgment on a necessitous act of state? , It may
well be questioned whether the dictum in The Zamora, that the
court is to apply the accepted rule. of international law even as
against an Order in Council, is not a counsel of perfection, scarcely
consistent with the position of a court of prize. \Vhy should a court,
deriving its authority from an act of prerogative,85 not be limited
by similar prerogative acts, as well as by statute? How can a national court, except under extremely exceptional circumstances, be
expected as a matter of fact to question an essential policy of its
Government, especially when that policy is in dispute with other
States? And in cases such as The Leonora it is difficult to see how
a satisfactory legal decision can be reached, as the court is precluded
from full inquiry into those facts, which, in the final analysis, de-·
termine the legality of the act of state. It is very doubtful whether
a doctrine such as this tends to the logical development of the law of
nations. The view of Lord Stowell, set forth in The Fox, 56 that
"'See The Zamora, [1916), 2 A. C. 77, 97.
85 By the Order in Council authorizing the constitution of the prize court, the court
is required to adjudge and condemn "according to the course of the Admiralty and the
Law of Nations, and the Statutes, Rules, and Regulations for the time being in force in
that behalf." Pulling, Manual of Emergency Legislation, 249.
""Edwards. 3u, 312.
This, of course, according to the received doctrine of English Jaw is heterodox.
But without going into detail, it may be suggested, ( t) that a court oi prize, as far
as the authority constituting it is concerned, is a national court, (2) that there is no
logical reason, aside from the British distrust of the prerogative inherited from the
period of the Civil War, why the court should not be bound by an e.xecutive order
as well as by statute, (3) that, in cases such as The Leonora involving vital plllitical
problems, the courts do and will attempt, if placed in a position where they must choose
between the custom of nations and an Order in Council, to · reconcile the two, even
though the result be a species of logical acrobatics, (4) that, in any event, t11e couru
will still apply international law, in those cases in which they are not bound by statute
or order. See the interesting suggestions of Sir Francis Piggott on this point, The
Grotius Society, Problems of the War, ill, 99. See also Picciotto, The Relation of
International Law to the Law of England and of the United States, Ch. II, 26-47.
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there is an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the conformity of
an Order in Council to the international law, seems more consistent
with the administrative functions of a court of prize. At the least,
it would relieve the Court of a responsibility which it is ill qualified
to assume, so that occasional strange gestures on its part might be
avoided. Nor would it deprive the Court, in all save exceptional
cases determined by statute or order, of its proud position as a tribunal apply the common law of nations.s7
HESSEL EDWARD YNTEMA.

University of Michigan.
"'Since this article was written, there has come to hand the decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in The Stigstad, L. J. R. 88 p. 33, affirming the judgment
of the Court below upon tbe' ground that the detention which relied upon by the neutral
claimant ~s invalidating the Order in Council of March n, 1915, was not, considering
all the circmnstances of the case, an unreasonable inconvenience to neutral shipping. It
will be noticed that the rule laid down in The Zamora, [1916], 2 A. C. 77, 98, already
referred to, is applied rather than that expressed by Sir Samuel Evans in The I.eonora,
[1918], P. 182, 228, to which especial objection was made in the course of this article.
The Judicial Committee, however, expressly refrains from deciding the issue in The Leo·
nora, [1918], P. 182. The effect of the decision, nevertheless, is finally to reognize retaliation as an accepted doctrine of English prize law and, by implication to assert as
q principle of international law that neutral rights are liable to restriction by the arbitrary
act of a single belligerent during the course of hostilities. To this as well as to the
fiction still maintained by the Judicial Committee that Sir William Scot decided that re·
taliation is in accordance with international law, the writer on the grounds and to the
extent already stated, must raise a r.:spectful but vigorous protest.

